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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 99-3052 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM GILCHRIST 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 96-cr-00094-1) 
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 1999 
 
Before: ROTH and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
SHADUR1, District Judge 
 
(Filed: June 6, 2000) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1. Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Court Judge for the 
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
The government appeals from an order entered by the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
denying a motion to reinstate a dismissed indictment 
against appellee Gilchrist. Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
the indictment was dismissed on the motion of the 
government in exchange for Gilchrist's guilty plea to a 
lesser count. After sentencing, Gilchrist successfully 
withdrew his guilty plea, and the district court denied the 
government's motion to reinstate the dismissed indictment 
on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired. 
 
We find that we have jurisdiction over this criminal 
appeal by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3731. 
We also find that the appellant fails to offer sufficient 
reason why the statute of limitations should not be applied. 
We will, therefore, affirm the order of the district court. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural History 
 
Defendant-appellee William Gilchrist was indicted in April 
1996, for engaging in commercial bribery in violation of the 
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1952(a)(3), and for conspiracy to 
engage therein, 18 U.S.C. S 371. Gilchrist, an operator of a 
trucking company, was charged with paying kickbacks to a 
Welch's Foods transportation manager in order to continue 
receiving a share of Welch's trucking business. On 
December 9, 1996, a binding plea agreement was executed 
between Gilchrist and the government pursuant to Rule 
11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The 
agreement provided the following: (1) the government 
agreed not to prosecute Gilchrist on the two charges; (2) 
Gilchrist agreed to plead guilty to the lesser charge of 
misprision of a felony, 18 U.S.C. S 4; (3) the government 
agreed to stipulate to a sentence of 9 months of 
incarceration, 1 month home detention, a $10,000fine, and 
a $50 assessment;2 and (4) if the district court rejected the 
stipulated sentence or imposed a more severe penalty, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under the indictment, Gilchrist stood to face 10 years incarceration, 
a period of supervised release, a $500,000 fine, and a $100 assessment. 
United States v. Gilchrist, 130 F.3d 1131, 1132 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 523 U.S. 1023 (1998). 
 
                                2 
  
Gilchrist would have the right to withdraw his plea 
agreement and plead anew. On December 11, 1996, the 
parties also filed a joint Stipulation Pursuant to Plea 
Agreement, which provided that the facts in the Stipulation 
were the only facts that Gilchrist admitted. 
 
Gilchrist pled guilty to misprision in December 1996. On 
April 22, 1997, the original indictment was dismissed. At 
sentencing on the same day, the district court imposed a 
sentence identical to that provided in the plea agreement 
with the addition of 12 months of supervised release. 
Gilchrist did not object at the hearing, but three days later 
moved the district court to correct sentence pursuant to 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c). Because the district court failed to 
rule on the motion within 7 days, Gilchrist filed a notice of 
appeal to this court in May 1997. 
 
On appeal, Gilchrist sought to withdraw his guilty plea, 
arguing that the plea agreement was breached because the 
terms of his sentence were more severe than those specified 
in the plea agreement. We reversed and remanded the case 
to the district court with instructions to impose the 
sentence described in the plea agreement or to allow the 
withdrawal of the guilty plea. United States v. Gilchrist, 130 
F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1023 
(1998). 
 
On remand, the district court set a re-sentencing date. 
The re-sentencing, however, never took place because the 
district court on October 9, 1998, granted Gilchrist's 
renewed motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district 
court found that the record was devoid of evidence of active 
concealment, i.e., there was an insufficient factual basis for 
the misprision plea. The government on October 19, 1998, 
moved to reinstate the original indictment, requesting that 
the parties be restored to the pre-plea agreement status 
quo. Gilchrist opposed the motion on the grounds that the 
statute of limitations had expired on the dismissed 
indictment on or about June 30, 1997. The district court 
agreed with Gilchrist and denied the government's motion 
on December 21, 1998. The government now appeals. 
 
II. Jurisdiction 
 
As an initial matter, we turn to the question of whether 
this court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the 
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government in a criminal prosecution. It has long been held 
that the government cannot take an appeal in a criminal 
case unless Congress expressly grants that right. United 
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); 
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); United States 
v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892). We ourselves have 
reaffirmed the "well-settled rule that an appeal by the 
prosecution in a criminal case is not favored and must be 
based upon express statutory authority." Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529, 530 (3d Cir. 
1973). The government argues that statutory authority for 
this appeal, and hence our jurisdiction over it, is found in 
18 U.S.C. S 3731. We agree. 
 
The Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3731, as amended 
in 1970, provides the following:3 
 
       In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall 
       lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or 
       order of a district court dismissing an indictment or 
       information or granting a new trial after verdict or 
       judgment, as to any one or more counts, except that no 
       appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the 
       United States Constitution prohibits further 
       prosecution. 
 
       . . . 
 
       The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within 
       thirty days after the decision, judgment or order has 
       been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted. 
 
       . . . 
 
       The provisions of this section shall be liberally 
       construed to effectuate its purposes. 
 
In deciding whether an order of the district court denying 
the reinstatement of an indictment is an appealable order 
within the meaning of S 3731, we must "give effect to 
Congress's intent" with respect to the question at issue. 
Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 
202 (3d Cir. 1998). To discern congressional intent, we first 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The 1970 amendment to 18 U.S.C. S 3731 was passed as Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1890. 
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look to the plain language of the statute. Id . (". . .every 
exercise of statutory interpretation begins with the plain 
language of the statute itself.") (citations omitted); see also 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. , 447 
U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("We begin with the familiar canon of 
statutory construction that the starting point for 
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself."). 
On its face, the language of S 3731 is ambiguous as to 
whether it applies to an order denying the reinstatement of 
an indictment. On the one hand, such an order is not 
specified in the statute. But on the other hand, what is 
listed may be merely illustrative and not exhaustive, given 
that the statute expressly forbids its application only when 
double jeopardy is implicated. 
 
An inquiry into the legislative history and the underlying 
legislative intent of the statute provides more guidance. The 
substance of 18 U.S.C. S 3731 was most recently amended 
in 1970.4 The pre-1970 amendment version of S 3731 (1964 
ed., Supp.V) authorized an appeal by the government in 
criminal cases "[f]rom a decision or judgment setting aside, 
or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count 
thereof except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the United States is provided by this section." Although 
the language of the statute seemed to capture a very broad 
range of circumstances, it was generally interpreted as 
authorizing an appeal to a court of appeals only when the 
decision setting aside or dismissing an indictment or 
information was based upon the invalidity of construction 
of the statute upon which the indictment was founded. See, 
e.g., United States v. Apex Distributing Co. , 270 F.2d 747, 
755 (9th Cir. 1959) (government may, under S 3731, appeal 
an order dismissing an indictment or information"only 
where the order was based upon a defect in the indictment 
or information, or in the institution of the prosecution."); 
United States v. Nardolillo, 252 F.2d 755, 757-58 (1st Cir. 
1958) (government cannot appeal from a dismissal where 
dismissal was based on the government's failure to comply 
with discovery order). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There were further amendments to 18 U.S.C.S 3731 in 1984, 1986, 
and 1994. These amendments do not concern us here because they were 
technical in nature and do not affect our analysis. 
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Dissatisfaction with this limited ability of the government 
to appeal in criminal cases was partly what prompted 
Congress to undertake the amendment of S 3731 in 1970.5 
"[T]he terminology of the Criminal Appeals Act, as 
interpreted today, does not provide for an appeal by the 
United States to any court in a large variety of cases where 
the dismissal is based on grounds having nothing to do 
with any defect in the indictment or the construction or 
invalidity of the underlying statute." S. Rep. No. 91-1296, 
at 5 (1970). "S.3132 [1970 amendment] will afford the 
Government the right of appeal from the dismissal of a 
criminal prosecution in all cases where the decision 
rendered by the district judge does not result in an 
acquittal after jeopardy. As a result, review of a lower court 
dismissal will be precluded only where the double jeopardy 
clause of the Constitution mandates it. . . . The amended 
Criminal Appeals Act is intended to be liberally construed 
so as to effectuate its purpose of permitting the 
Government to appeal from dismissals of criminal 
prosecutions by district courts in all cases where the 
Constitution permits. . . ." Id. at 18 See also H.R. Conf.Rep. 
No. 91-1768 at 21 (1970); 116 Cong. Rec. 35659 (1970) 
(remarks of Sen. Hruska). 
 
With this legislative history and underlying legislative 
intent of S 3731 in mind, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Congress also identified as a major problem of S 3731 the requirement 
that certain appeals could only be taken to the Supreme Court. "Under 
the current act, appeals from dismissals lie to the courts of appeals only 
where the dismissal of an indictment or information results from a 
finding of some defect therein, or an error of some sort in the 
institution 
of the prosecution itself such as an irregularity in the grand jury 
proceedings. All other appealable dismissals must be taken directly to 
the Supreme Court. . . . The present statutory division of appeals from 
dismissals between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals has 
. . .proven difficult to apply and often results in far too much judicial 
time and effort being absorbed in deciding the threshold question of the 
court in which the appeal properly belongs." S. Rep. No. 91-1296 at 13, 
15 (1970). This problem was resolved by amendingS 3731 to provide for 
all appeals to be taken to the court of appeals,"except where a ground 
for the decision is a holding of invalidity of an Act of Congress and the 
case is considered of general public importance." S. Rep. No. 91-1296 at 
18 (1970). 
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consistently construed S 3731 to authorize all appeals 
whenever the Constitution would permit. Serfass v. United 
States, 420 U.S. 377, 387 (1975). "In light of the language 
of the present version of S 3731 including the admonition 
that its `provisions shall be liberally construed to effectuate 
its purposes,' and of its legislative history, it is clear to us 
that Congress intended to authorize an appeal to a court of 
appeals in this kind of case so long as further prosecution 
would not be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. 
The purpose of S 3731 was to "remove all statutory barriers 
to Governmental appeals and to allow appeals whenever the 
Constitution would permit." United States v. Wilson, 420 
U.S. 332, 337 (1975); see also, United States v. Scott, 437 
U.S. 82, 84-85 (1978). 
 
Appellee Gilchrist argues that S 3731 is inapplicable here 
because the government, and not Gilchrist, moved for the 
dismissal of the indictment in the first instance. But 
nothing turns on such a distinction. It still remains that 
the government fulfilled the requirements of S 3731: upon 
the district court's denial of the government's motion to 
reinstate the original indictment, the governmentfiled a 
timely notice of appeal with this court. We therefore find 
that the government's appeal was authorized by S 3731.6 
 
III. Applicability of Statute of Limitations 
 
We now turn to the merits of this appeal and consider 
whether the statute of limitations applies to an indictment 
that was dismissed under a plea agreement, thereby 
barring its reinstatement after the limitations period has 
expired. Our review of a district court's legal determinations 
and its application of legal precepts to facts is plenary. 
Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 
766 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We considered this very issue in United States v. Midgley, 
142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998), where we were presented with 
a fact pattern closely resembling that before us here. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we have jurisdiction pursuant to S 3731, we do not reach the 
merits of the government's alternative argument for jurisdiction based on 
the Collateral Order Doctrine. 
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defendant in Midgley entered into a plea agreement with 
the government pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty 
to one count of a six-count indictment in exchange for the 
dismissal of the remaining counts. The plea agreement 
contained no waiver of the statute of limitations defense as 
to the counts to be dismissed. While incarcerated for the 
one count to which he pled guilty and after the statute of 
limitations had run for the dismissed counts, Midgley filed 
a motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds that the 
conduct to which he pled guilty did not constitute a 
criminal offense under a United States Supreme Court 
decision that was announced while he was incarcerated. 
Midgley's motion was granted and the governmentfiled a 
motion to reinstate the dismissed counts. The district court 
denied the government's request. 
 
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of the district court. 
Nothing in 18 U.S.C. S 3282, the general federal statute of 
limitations, we concluded, suggests that it does not apply to 
counts of an indictment dismissed pursuant to a plea  
agreement.7 We were especially mindful that to hold 
otherwise would subvert the policy objective animating the 
statute. A statute of limitations first and foremost protects 
the accused "from having to defend themselves against 
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by 
the passage of time. . . ." Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 
112, 114 (1970). "Limitations statutes. . .are intended to 
foreclose the potential for inaccuracy and unfairness that 
stale evidence and dull memories may occasion in an 
unduly delayed trial." United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 
113, 127 (3d Cir. 1981). "[T]he applicable statute of 
limitations is the primary guarantee against bringing overly 
stale criminal charges. Such statutes represent legislative 
assessments of relative interests of the State and the 
defendant in administering and receiving justice. . . ." 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (internal 
quotations, citation bracket, ellipses, and footnotes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. 18 U.S.C. S 3282 provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by 
law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, 
not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is 
instituted within five years next after such offense shall have been 
committed." 
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omitted). Criminal limitations statutes, therefore, are "to be 
liberally interpreted in favor of repose." United States v. 
Habig, 390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968). In light of the 
extraordinarily important purpose served by a statute of 
limitations--protecting the accused from a situation where 
his right to a fair trial would be prejudiced--we concluded 
in Midgley that S 3282 "establishes a fixed limitation period 
with no exception," and that, therefore, the reinstatement of 
the dismissed counts was barred. 142 F.3d at 174. 
 
The government here attempts to circumvent our 
conclusion in Midgley by arguing that the reinstatement of 
the original indictment against Gilchrist is permitted 
pursuant to l8 U.S.C. S 3289, which provides, in pertinent 
part, that: 
 
       whenever an indictment or information charging a 
       felony is dismissed for any reason before the period 
       prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has 
       expired, and such period will expire within six calendar 
       months of the date of the dismissal of the indictment 
       or information, a new indictment may be returned in 
       the appropriate jurisdiction within six calendar months 
       of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, 
       or, in the event of an appeal, within 60 days of the date 
       the dismissal of the indictment or information becomes 
       final. . . . 
 
(emphasis added). The government contends that this case 
falls within the latter scenario contemplated byS 3289 
where an order of a dismissal is appealed. We see no merit 
in this argument. We conclude that S 3289 is directed at a 
count that is appealed. The dismissed counts here were not 
the subject of the prior appeal. Moreover, neither Gilchrist 
nor the government ever appealed the April 22, 1997 Order 
dismissing the original indictment. The thirty days appeal 
period provided by 18 U.S.C. S 3731 for the dismissed 
counts of the indictment expired on May 22, 1997, and the 
government cannot now be allowed to re-litigate the original 
dismissal. The fact that one count survived that dismissal 
date and was appealed does not resuscitate the dismissed 
counts. We accordingly find that Midgley is controlling and 
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that S 3282 bars the government from reinstating the 
indictment against Gilchrist.8 
 
We do not reach our ruling without considering the 
possibility that it might encourage defendants to delay 
acting on their rights until the statute of limitations has 
expired on their dismissed counts. But, as we noted in 
Midgley, the government may foreclose such a possibility by 
including in future plea agreements a clause that requires 
the defendant to waive the statute of limitations defense as 
to dismissed counts if the defendant, after the period of 
limitations has expired on the original charges, withdraws 
or challenges the guilty plea. 142 F.3d at 174; see also 
United States v. Podde, 105 F.3d 813, 821 (2d Cir. 1997), 
vacating United States v. Reguer, 901 F.Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995). The government may also negotiate with the 
defendant a guilty plea for more than one count. Id. To be 
sure, such prophylactic measures place an additional 
burden on the government, but that burden is slight when 
considered alongside the defendant's paramount right to 
present an effective defense to the charges against him. 
Section 3289 creates a fixed limitation period to protect 
precisely that right and we see no need to make an 
exception here. 
 
Finally, we do not consider the government's equitable 
tolling argument because the issue was raised for the first 
time in its brief to us; it was not raised in the motion that 
was before the district court. An argument not raised in the 
district court is not properly preserved for appellate review. 
In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Both parties mistakenly consider the statute of limitations to have 
expired on June 30, 1997. That assumption, however, fails to recognize 
the statute was tolled from the date the original indictment was returned 
on April 2, 1996, until it was dismissed on April 22, 1997--a period of 
one year and twenty days. See United States v. Stansfield, 171 F.3d 806, 
813 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999). But the tolling does not change the result here 
because even the extended period had expired before the government 
moved to reinstate the previously dismissed counts on October 19, 1998. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
district court denying the government's motion to reinstate 
charges against the appellee. 
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